INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2008, the United States Federal Reserve Bank, under the chairmanship of Ben Bernanke, took emergency measures in an attempt to forestall a national, if not international, economic meltdown. The actual effectiveness of these unprecedented measures has been hotly debated. Unfortunately, regardless of their efficacy, the Federal Reserve stepped outside the scope of its legal authority in taking several of these actions.
This Essay will analyze how the Federal Reserve (the Fed) violated the law and, in doing so, will examine how these illegal actions have compromised the authority that Congress has granted to the Fed. In order to place this malfeasance into context, this Essay will examine the origins of the Federal Reserve and how this unique entity has dramatically, and often controversially, expanded the scope of its power.
It will then analyze how the Fed's willful violation of the law has critically undermined the United States' economy in both the short-and long-term. Finally, it will conclude by proposing legislative reform that would begin to resolve this problem by placing the secretive maneuvers of the Fed into the full light of public scrutiny.
Ultimately, when viewed objectively and within its historical context, it is clear that the Fed acted beyond the scope of its legislative authority and, by doing so, harmed the financial interests of the United States, both at home and abroad. This warrants, at the very least, a full and independent audit of the Federal Reserve System to determine its compliance with existing law.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

A. Congressional Efforts that Led to the Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the Fed as the central bank for the United States.' Prior to that, several attempts to centralize banking efforts had come and gone. For instance, in 1791, Congress chartered the First Bank of the United States. 2 The Second Bank of the United States was chartered after the first had expired. 3 After the Second National Bank charter expired in 1836, the country operated without a central bank. 4 In 1907, several bank panics renewed the debate regarding the wisdom of establishing a central bank. 5 Existing law at the time mandated that banks maintain only a small fraction of their overall deposits in reserve. 6 The remaining reserves could be used to offer loans. 7 Unfortunately, these low deposit reserve requirements often led to over-lending. 8 Banks made loans that, in the short run, could only be converted into cash at a fraction of their value. 9 This resulted in a "race to the bank" when liquidity problems arose.
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Ultimately, several influential leaders of the nation's financial community concluded that federal action was needed to remedy a lack of * Chad Denver Emerson is an Associate Professor of Law at Faulkner University's Thomas Goode Jones School of Law. He would like to thank his research assistant Robyn Cannon for her excellent and thorough assistance in this matter. He would also like to thank Karl Denninger for his research and attention into this important matter. liquidity in the country's economy." The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 created the National Monetary Commission and tasked it with the responsibility of proposing a permanent solution to the problems of illiquidity and bank panics. The work of this Commission ultimately led to the creation of today's Federal Reserve System.
B. The Adoption of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act
Following the adoption of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908, the National Monetary Commission, headed by Senator Nelson Aldrich, researched different banking and currency schemes' 3 and focused on the European banking system. 14 In particular, Aldrich consulted with influential banking leader Paul Warburg who convinced Aldrich that, in order to avoid future liquidity crises, the United States needed a central bank that was controlled by private bankers and financial experts.' 5 This plan could be patterned after the European system and utilize centralized banking as well as currency backed by commercial assets-a combination that the Commission believed would allow for quick liquidity. 16 Aldrich and Warburg also concluded that the mandatory reserve requirement should be increased to force banks to transform a maximum amount of bank assets into cash without disturbing the general condition of the economy. 17 The influential American Bankers Association responded positively to the Aldrich Plan.' 8 Doubts, though, remained in Congress, especially after Woodrow Wilson was elected President of the United States. Progressive Democrats, including William Jennings Bryan, strongly opposed Aldrich's plan because it placed the control of a central bank and monetary policy in the hands of private bankers rather than the federal government.
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As an alternative to the Aldrich Plan, Representative Carter Glass of Virginia proposed a solution that would add liquidity without utilizing a central bank. 2 1 The Glass-Willis Plan called for twelve or more privately owned regional banks that would perform central banking functions, such as holding member banks' reserves and issuing currency backed by commercial assets and gold. 22 Basically, this was a decentralized version of the Aldrich Plan. 23 Ultimately, there was a compromise between the Aldrich Plan and the Glass-Willis Plan that included the addition of a central board that coordinated monetary policy through a series of regional reserve banks. 24 This compromise plan called for exclusive government control of the Federal Reserve Board and made currency printed by the Federal Reserve an obligation of the United States government. 25 Though Representative Glass still opposed a central bank, he agreed to the plan when President Wilson insisted upon centralized public control. 26 Key leaders of the powerful banking industry preferred a system that was controlled exclusively by private interests and strongly opposed the compromise plan. 27 Despite the banking industry's opposition, President Wilson presented the compromise plan to Congress on June 28, 1913.28 A few days later, Glass sponsored the bill in the House of Representatives, and Senator Robert Owen introduced an identical bill in the Senate. 29 Progressive Democrats in the House sought federal supervision of the Federal Reserve and remained skeptical of the bill. 30 34 While the Senate debated the bill, Frank Vanderlip, a prominent New York banker, proposed yet another variation of a central banking plan, which consisted of one federally controlled Federal Reserve Bank with twelve branches of reserve banks around the country. 35 Though the Vanderlip Plan gained considerable support in the Senate and influenced debate on the issue, in the end it lost out to the amended Federal Reserve Act which did not include final federal government control. 36 On December 19, 1913, with full Democratic support, the Senate passed its amended version of the Federal Reserve Act by a vote of fiftyfour to thirty-four. 37 Since the House's version of the Federal Reserve Act differed slightly from the version passed by the Senate, the bills were submitted to a conference committee composed of members of both chambers. 38 The conference committee incorporated various aspects of both bills, and two days after the conference committee concluded its work, both the House and the Senate approved the compromise version. 39 On December 23, 1913, Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act into law. 40 
C. The Organization of the Federal Reserve
The history of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act demonstrates that there was a common belief during that time that a change in the banking and currency system was needed in order to bolster confidence and security in the minds of Americans. It also highlighted the disagreements between conservatives who advocated for as little government interference in the banking system as possible, and progressives who sought a central banking system controlled by the federal government. 4 53 To accomplish this, the Act made several changes. First, it established that the Board of Governors would be comprised of seven members appointed by the President and subject to confirmation by the Senate. 54 In addition, the Board would no longer include the Comptroller of the Currency or the Secretary of the Treasury as members. 55 These changes removed control of the banking system and monetary policy from the federal government and concentrated it with the Fed.
The Act also decreased the autonomy of the twelve individual Federal Reserve Banks. Prior to the Act, these banks were given broad discretion over whether to participate in open market activities. 56 [Vol. 1: 109
B. Federal Reserve-Treasury Department Accord of 1951
In 1942, at the request of the Treasury Department, the Fed voluntarily agreed to maintain a low interest rate on government bonds so that the United States could cheaply finance the war debt. 58 In order to maintain the low interest rate, the Fed gave up control of the size of its portfolio as well as the money supply.
59
After the war, President Harry Truman and the Treasury Department sought to keep the interest rate low in order to protect the public's investment in wartime bonds, as well as to contain inflationary measures as the Korean War ensued. 60 This battle over control of interest rates and monetary policy in general led to the 1951 Accord (the Accord). 61 By eliminating the Fed's obligation to monetize Treasury Department debt at a fixed rate, 62 the Accord restored the Fed's independence 63 and expanded the Fed's powers. Yet again, the Fed was further removed from federal control.
C. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
Before the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,64 banks formed holding companies in order to own both banking and non-banking businesses and geographically, to expand into areas where branch banking was otherwise restricted. 65 The Act also increased the Fed's power: by requiring each bank holding company to register with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 67 the Act granted to the Fed's Board of Governors the responsibility of regulating and supervising bank holding company activities.
6 8 In particular, the Board of Governors was given the power to regulate activities in the areas of banking, finance, or insurance as long as they were closely related to the business of banking or the management or control of banks. 69 Ultimately, the 1956 Act afforded the Fed broad power and discretion over all institutions that have any control over or influence in the banking system, not just banks themselves.
D. The International Banking Act of 1978
The International Banking Act of 197870 was passed in order to promote competitive equality between foreign and domestic banks, improve federal control over monetary policy, and provide a federal presence in the regulation and supervision of foreign bank activities inside the United States. In order to achieve these goals, the Act placed foreign banks and domestic corporations that conduct business with foreign financial operations under the supervision of the Fed; 72 the Fed's scope of authority was again expanded.
E. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978
Congress passed the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 197873 in response to America's fear of a recession in light of high (Jan. 1990 [Vol. 1: 109 inflation and unemployment rates. 74 Instead of the singular goal of full employment, as set forth in the Employment Act of 1946, the 1978 Act set forth several economic goals, including full employment, production growth, price stability, trade balance, and a balanced budget. 75 Specifically, the Act required the Fed to establish a monetary policy that encouraged long-run growth, minimized inflation, and promoted price stability. 76 It also integrated the monetary policy of the Fed with the economic policy of the President. 77 Through these changes, Congress created a situation in which the Fed exercised a more direct presence in and greater influence over the national economy and its long-term goals.
F. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 198078 changed the country's monetary policy and deregulated the banking system. Under the Act, all banks, including credit unions and savings and loan companies, were allowed to access the Federal Reserve Discount Window 79 in order to obtain credit advances. 8 0 In return, all banking institutions in the United States were essentially required to abide by the Fed's rules and policies. 81 The end result was to expand the Fed's power over both America's banking industry and the economy in general.
G. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 199182 was passed in response to the thrift industry crisis. 86 By requiring this approval, the Act strengthened the Fed's ability to examine and supervise foreign banking and further expanded the Fed's influence over the American banking industry and economy.
H. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 is a far-reaching, complex law that covers many aspects of the banking industry, from mergers of institutions, to protection of private consumer information. 87 It was passed under the auspices of modernizing the United States financial services industry. 88 It removed the prohibitions on cross ownership of banks, securities firms, and insurance companies that were established by the Banking Act of 1933,89 and it permitted commercial banks to underwrite securities and own insurance companies through federally regulated subsidiaries.
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The Act also established the Fed as the regulator of these banks and their subsidiaries, known as financial holding institutions. 91 It gave the Fed and the Treasury Department the right to veto each other's decisions on newly acquired financial powers. 92 However, more than anything else, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 significantly expanded the Fed's power-the Fed's authority grew to include the broad category of financial holding institutions, which included banks, securities firms, and insurance companies. 
I. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 as a response to the subprime mortgage crisis in an effort to bail out the United States financial system. 93 The Act allowed the federal government to purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the purpose of providing stability and preventing disruption to the country's economic growth. 94 It authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) in order to purchase troubled assets from any financial institution. 95 In addition, the Act directed the Federal Reserve Board and other housing and finance agencies to take a variety of actions, including modifying the terms of mortgage loans and reducing the number of foreclosures.
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The Act also allowed the Fed to pay banks a high rate of interest on deposits held as reserve beginning October 1, 2008,7 instead of 2011, as specified by prior law. 9 8 The Congressional Budget Office estimated that over the next three years, the exercise of this provision will reduce the Fed's payments of its profits, which are considered revenue to the Treasury Department in the federal budget. 99 Through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the Fed has become an integral part of rescuing the United States economy from both current and future instability.
With the passage of this Act, the Fed's power was at an apex in terms of scope and authority. From its original role as a central bank primarily focused on monetary policy, the Fed became a gatekeeper over much of the nation's financial system and one of the nation's most expansive economic regulators. Yet, even with these broad powers, the Fed did not possess unlimited authority. As the current economic crisis began to unfold, it became clear that the Fed did not understand these limitations. This expectation, however, should have been balanced with the fact that one of Bernanke's most renowned areas of study and analysis is the Great Depression. 1 0 3 Based on his research, Bernanke concluded that the Great Depression had been exacerbated by the Fed's adherence to orthodox policy. 1 0 4 More than anything else, Bernanke's belief that extraordinary measures could have mitigated the Great Depression foreshadowed the extremely market-intrusive measures that the Fed would take as the current crisis unfolded. In response to the crisis, the Bernanke-led Fed engaged in a series of unprecedented regulatory maneuvers. These ranged from an adjustment of existing Fed programs to the creation of entirely new ones. [Vol. 1: 109
See generally
A. The Adjustment of Existing Programs
In the beginning of 2007, early indications of a subprime mortgage crisis began to percolate to the surface.' 05 One of the key problems was the unanticipated increase of delinquencies in this segment of the mortgage industry.l°6 Despite the growing number of failed subprime mortgages and the May 2007 bankruptcy of New Century Financial Corp., a major subprime lender, Bernanke continued to argue that the problem of subprime mortgages did not represent a risk to the financial system as a whole: "We believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system."' 1 0 7 Even as late as August 7, 2007, the Fed refused to reduce its federal funds rate-a key Fed program that promotes market liquidity through overnight inter-bank lending.' 0 8 By refusing to reduce the federal funds rate, the Fed signaled that no change in market liquidity was necessary.
The Fed's refusal to act, however, was short-lived. Indeed, only ten days later, the Fed reversed course and cut the Primary Credit Rateanother key interest rate-by one half of 1 percent.'°9 Throughout the fall of 2007, the Fed continued to reduce these rates, eventually cutting the federal funds rate to 4.25 percent by December 2007.110
Despite these rapid interest rate cuts, the threats facing the economy continued to grow rather than contract. It became clear that the Fed would have to take more dramatic steps to increase liquidity in the financial system."' The Fed's next step would be to establish a series of new liquidity programs. 111. At the same time, the federal government, through both the Treasury Department and Congress, was implementing a variety of relief programs aimed at addressing the
B. The Creation of New Programs
In December 2007, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility-one of its first new programs aimed at addressing the economic challenges.
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This program was designed to inject liquidity into the financial system; the Fed would auction funds to qualified depository institutions, and a broad array of assets would be eligible to serve as collateral for these auctioned loans. 1 3 At the same time, the FOMC announced plans to increase liquidity on an international scale through currency swap arrangements with the Swiss National Bank and European Central Bank.' Going forward, the Fed continued to announce new and expanded programs that were designed to increase liquidity in the financial system. The Fed lowered interest rates to essentially zero percent," 8 accepted even growing amount of mortgage defaults and the overall financial problems that they were causing. For more information on these programs, see Chad D. [Vol. 1: 109 more types of loan collateral, 19 and ultimately provided a bailout for American International Group (AIG). 12 Many of these actions, while unprecedented in nature, were within the expanded authority that Congress had given the Fed over the last half-century. This, however, was not uniformly the case.
IV. THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S ILLEGAL EXPANSION OF ITS ECONOMIC AUTHORITY
With these new and expanded programs, the Fed unquestionably implemented an aggressive series of actions in response to the current economic crisis. While the effectiveness of these programs is subject to great debate, in many cases their actual legality is not. Although the Fed has a broad array of powers, including a set of emergency powers that further increase its ability to expand existing programs and develop new ones in certain situations, the powers of the Fed are not unlimited.
In responding to the current crisis, the Fed exceeded its statutory limitations. The Fed initiated several programs that fall outside the broad scope of authority that Congress granted to it. It engaged in activities which are impermissible under the 1913 enabling act and subsequent amendments.121 It has broken the law.
A. The Federal Reserve's Limited Authority to Purchase Private Assets
To fully understand how the Fed exceeded its authority in responding to the current financial crisis, one must make a distinction between two types of assets: public assets and private assets. Public assets are those either originating from or fully guaranteed by the government. They may come in the form of bonds issued by the government itself or through bonds or other obligations issued by a third-party, but fully backed by the government. All other assets are private.
In addition, one must also distinguish between two types of transactions: loans and purchases. the power to engage in both loans and purchases, but does so in significantly different ways. For instance, the Fed has the power to provide loans to private parties when those loans are backed by collateral.1 22 In particular, the Fed may regularly provide loans to commercial banks (also known as depository institutions), 123 and it may provide loans to non-commercial banks in limited emergency situations. 24 Although the Fed may purchase certain obligations outright, 125 the power to purchase assets is much more limited in scope than the power to provide loans. In particular, section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act outlines the narrow scope of the Fed's authority to make purchases. Section 14(b)(1) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any bonds, notes, or other obligations which are direct obligations of the United States or which are fully guaranteed by the United States as to principal and interest may be bought and sold without regard to maturities but only in the open market.' 26 In addition, section 14(b)(2) permits the Fed to purchase assets not only backed by the United States directly, but also those guaranteed by a United States government agency. 127 This means that all purchases made by the Fed, as opposed to loans issued by the Fed, are limited to those obligations in which principal and interest are either owned by the United States or fully guaranteed by it or one of its agencies. Noticeably missing from this authority is the power of the Fed to purchase privately owned assets outright. 1 28 The Act does provide the Fed with more expansive powers in certain emergency situations:
122. For a detailed discussion of the scope and history of the Fed's lending powers, see 128. Privately owned assets are neither issued by the federal government nor generally guaranteed by the government.
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In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with the provisions of section 357 of this Title, to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an individual or partnership or corporation the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals, partnerships, or corporations shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.1
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A careful review of these emergency powers reveals that the Fed exceeded even this increased authority with its recent actions. For instance, the emergency section applies only to the discounting of notes, drafts, and bills of exchange in unusual and exigent circumstances. Nowhere does the section provide the Fed with authority to purchase private assets. As a result, under the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed cannot purchase notes or drafts that do not comport with section 14.130 Significantly, the section 14 authority to purchase private bills of exchange is significantly limited in scope and duration-generally less than ninety days.' 1 These clear limits on the Fed's purchasing powers were succinctly stated by two members of the Board of Governors: "There is no express provision in the Federal Reserve Act for the Federal Reserve to use its open-market authority to purchase private-sector promissory notes such as mortgages or corporate bonds or to purchase equities."' 32 Nevertheless, as the current economic crisis grew, the Fed decided that the danger posed to the financial system as a whole warranted actions that were beyond the 
B. The Federal Reserve's Improper Equity Interests in Private Entities
In the cases of Bear Steams and AIG, the Fed acted outside the scope of its statutory authority by effectively purchasing assets that did not fall within the narrow purchase authority provided by the Federal Reserve Act.' " 33 Essentially, the Fed attempted to use legal trickery to disguise its illegal purchases of private assets from these companies. As one commentator described the situation:
[T]he Fed's assistance in the Bear Steams merger with JPMorgan Chase took a form that has some similarities to the TARP proposal. In the case of Bear Steams, the Fed created a limited liability corporation called Maiden Lane, and lent Maiden Lane $28.82 billion. Maiden Lane used the proceeds of that loan and another loan from JPMorgan Chase to purchase mortgage-related assets from Bear Steams. Thus, although the Fed created and controlled Maiden Lane, the assets were purchased and held by Maiden Lane, not the Fed. Similar to TARP, Maiden Lane plans to hold the assets until markets recover, and then sell the assets to repay its loans to the Fed and JPMorgan Chase.' Despite this statement, the Fed went on to claim that by "loaning" money to Maiden Lane to purchase Bear assets, rather than purchasing the assets directly from Bear Steams, it somehow complied with the Federal Reserve Act: the transaction constituted a lending activity for which the Fed has broad rights, rather than a purchasing activity. 37 As one [Vol. 1:109 commentator noted, this is not an accurate description of the actual transaction: "From an economic perspective, this complex arrangement is functionally identical to a purchase of the Bear portfolio by the Fed--one that's financed in small part by the subordinated $1 billion loan from JPMorgan."' ' 38 Another problem with this scheme is that nowhere in the Federal Reserve Act did Congress provide authority for the Fed to create subsidiary corporate entities as it did with Maiden Lane.' 39 The Fed cannot simply establish off-the-books shadow companies to avoid its restrictions under the Act. The legislative power of Congress cannot be circumvented by merely creating a LLC.
The Fed used two other Maiden Lane LLCs' 4° to divert Fed funds into impermissible AIG equity investments. Known as Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane 111,141 these LLCs were created by the Fed to purchase credit default swaps and mortgage securities from AIG; the diminished value of these assets was burdening the company to the point that its continued ability to operate was in question.' 42 While the Fed did not pay AIG directly, it essentially purchased assets from AIG-the Fed system was the true owner of the Maiden Lane entities. 143 As with the Bear Steams transaction, the Fed's attempt to conceal an illegal purchase of AIG assets through the use of a wholly-controlled LLC is, at best, a surreptitious attempt to circumvent the meaning of the Federal Reserve Act and, at worst, an intentional and purposeful violation of the law. 
C. The Federal Reserve's Overall Ineffective Response to the Current Crisis
The impropriety of the Fed's response to the current economic crisis is paralleled only by the Fed's ineffective work leading up to the crisis. Indeed, the Fed's decision to exceed its legislative authority was, in large part, the result of its failure to act proactively in preventing, or at least mitigating, the crisis in the first place. The scope of the Fed's failure to comprehend the extent of the looming economic crisis is evidenced by a review of the actual public statements made by the Fed leading up to the crisis, especially those made by Chairman Bernanke.
Considering the great amount of power that his office possesses, Chairman Bemanke is in a special position to inform the public as to the state of the economy. 144 Moreover, when he addresses the public, his statements typically represent the official views of the Fed.
14 5 In the present crisis, this has been problematic, because he has repeatedly failed to comprehend the scope and extent of the crisis.
Consider the following statements made by Mr. Bernanke as the crisis unfolded: BERNANKE: Well, unquestionably, housing prices are up quite a bit; I think it's important to note that fundamentals are also very strong. We've got a growing economy, jobs, incomes. We've got very low mortgage rates. We've got demographics supporting housing growth. We've got restricted supply in some places. So it's certainly understandable that prices would go up some. I don't know whether prices are exactly where they should be, but I think it's fair to say that much of what's happened is supported by the strength of the economy.
July 2005 INTERVIEWER:
Tell me, what is the worst-case scenario? Sir, we have so many economists coming on our air and saying, "Oh, this is a bubble, and it's going to burst, and this is going to be a real issue for the economy." Some say it could even cause a recession at some point. What is the worst-case scenario, if in fact we were to see prices come down substantially across the country? [Vol. 1: 109 BERNANKE: Well, I guess I don't buy your premise. It's a pretty unlikely possibility. We've never had a decline in house prices on a nationwide basis. So what I think is more likely is that house prices will slow, maybe stabilize: might slow consumption spending a bit. I don't think it's going to drive the economy too far from its full employment path, though.
INTERVIEWER: So would you agree with Alan Greenspan's comments recently that we've got some areas of the country that are seeing froth, not necessarily a national situation, but certainly froth in some areas? BERNANKE: You can see some types of speculation: investors turning over condos quickly. Those sorts of things you see in some local areas. I'm hopeful-I'm confident, in fact, that the bank regulators will pay close attention to the kinds of loans that are being made, and make sure that underwriting is done right. But I do think this is mostly a localized problem, and not something that's going to affect the national economy.
November 2006
BERNANKE: This scenario envisions that consumer spending, supported by rising incomes and the recent decline in energy prices, will continue to grow near its trend rate and that the drag on the economy from the [inaudible] housing sector will gradually diminish. The motor vehicles sector may already be showing signs of strengthening. After having cut production significantly in recent months, in response to the rise in inventory of unsold vehicles, automakers appear to have boosted the assembly rate a bit in November, and they have scheduled further increases for December. The effects of the housing correction on real economic activity are likely to persist into next year, as I've already noted. But the rate of decline in home construction should slow as the inventory of unsold new homes is gradually worked down.
February 2007
BERNANKE: We expect moderate growth going forward. We believe that if the housing sector begins to stabilize, and if some of the inventory corrections still going on in manufacturing begin to be completed, that there's a reasonable possibility that we'll see some strengthening in the economy sometime during the middle of the new year. Our assessment is that there's not much indication at this point that subprime mortgage issues have spread into the broader mortgage market, which still seems to be healthy. And the lending side of that still seems to be healthy.
July 2007
BERNANKE: The pace of home sales seems likely to remain sluggish for a time, partly as a result of some tightening in lending standards, and the recent increase in mortgage interest rates. Sales should ultimately be supported by growth in income and employment, as well as by mortgage rates that, despite the recent increase, remain fairly low relative to historical norms. However, even if demand stabilizes as we expect, the pace of construction will probably fall somewhat further, as builders work down the stocks of unsold new homes. Thus, declines in residential construction will likely continue to weigh on economic growth in coming quarters, although the magnitude of the drag on growth should diminish over time. The global economy continues to be strong, supported by solid economic growth abroad. U.S. exports should expand further in coming quarters. Overall, the U.S. economy seems likely to expand at a moderate pace over the second half of 2007, with growth then strengthening a bit in 2008 to a rate close to the economy's underlying trend. 1 46 Clearly, the Bernanke-led Fed repeatedly failed to recognize the severity and scope of the current economic crisis. This failure indicates a lack of overall competence in the execution of its legislative authoritysomething that impugns any deference it might receive in expansively interpreting its regulatory powers.
In no uncertain terms, the Fed failed in its efforts to recognize and measure the crisis in advance, as well as implement effective policy and programmatic responses. Individually, these failures damage the Fed's efficacy. Taken together, they evidence a systemic failure of the central bank. At the very least, this should provoke Congress to vigorously investigate the extent to which the Fed itself was a contributor to the severity of this crisis.
Unfortunately, the opacity of the Fed's actions is so cloudy that it is able to prevent a comprehensive examination of these practices. The Fed's ability to obscure an in-depth review of its illegal equity purchase activities provides the most convincing evidence in support of an initial, but significant step toward resolving this obfuscation: a comprehensive Though the Fed's illegal equity purchase activities are evident in a macro sense, the precise details of this malfeasance is difficult to expose, especially because Congress currently does not possess the power to comprehensively audit the Fed.' 48 This is true despite the fact that the Fed has the ability to control the monetary policy of the United States. The Fed can essentially make the federal government responsible for unlimited financial obligations through its loan and purchase powers. 149 At the same time, the Fed has historically been able to shield itself from complete and independent audits of its activities.
From the Federal Reserve Board's inception in 1913 until 1933, the federal government maintained a limited authority to audit some of its functions. 150 The 1933 Banking Act eliminated most of this authority leaving only a very narrow swath of audit authority. 151
It was not until the late 1970s that Congress restored the federal government's ability to engage in broader audits of the Fed's activities. This renewed authority arose out of the Federal Banking Agency Audit (FBAA) Act, which Congress passed in 1978.152 One of the main purposes of the FBAA Act was to expand congressional oversight over the Fed. 153 The Act empowered the Government Accounting Office (GAO) with "authority to audit the Board of Governors [and] Reserve Banks .... ,, 15 However, the Act was not as effective as it could have been-it specifically prohibited the GAO or any other independent entity from that is too narrowly crafted to effectively address the underlying issues discussed in the following section. These exceptions are problematic, because they include the sources of the Fed's faulty decisions, including the illegal equity purchases, made in response to the present economic crisis. The inability of any independent agency to audit the Fed's monetary actions and transactions with most foreign entities, as well as the activities of the FOMC, prevents a detailed review of the Fed's unprecedented actions in this matter. The result is a glaring "blind spot" in the government's ability to audit the agency that has the ability to bind it to near unlimited financial obligations. In response to the argument that the Fed faces little to no oversight, the Fed points to the Inspector General Act of 1978, which authorizes the Inspector General of the Federal Reserve System to engage in reviews of the areas that the FBAA Act prevents the GAO from auditing.' 56 However, this authority is insufficient for two reasons. First, the Fed's Inspector General, while certainly professing independence, is nevertheless still a part of the Federal Reserve System. As such, no matter how it is conducted, any audit by the Fed's Inspector General is simply a self-audit by the Fed. This in no way equates to an independent audit.
Worse still, by the Inspector General's own admission, the power of the office to review the areas excluded from the GAO's audit jurisdiction is limited and subject to the final authority of the Fed itself: The acknowledgment that the Fed has final discretion over the auditing power given to the Inspector General evidences the true inability for any entity-internal or external-to engage in an independent and comprehensive audit of the Fed's full range of activities. The GAO has some limited authority, and the Fed's Inspector General also has some limited authority. Neither entity, though, has absolute auditing power. This gap in auditing coverage allows the Fed to ultimately prevent a full review of the complete details behind its response to the current financial crisis.
Ultimately, because of the Fed's conduct, the federal government finds itself obligated on purchases for which Congress did not provide any budgetary appropriation. As one commentator described the situation:
If this case proves anything, it's that the Fed is ready to press the limits of its charter to keep the financial system afloat. Effectively acquiring the Bear [Steams] assets at a bargain price and then liquidating them is similar to what Resolution Trust Corp. did when it shut down savings and loans and auctioned off their loan portfolios in the 1990s. The difference is that Congress set up the RTC but had nothing to do with the Fed's moves. authority to engage in a comprehensive and independent audit of the Fed's activities, including those related to the current financial crisis. The importance of this authority is evidenced by the strong bicongressional support that both bills have received. Indeed, as of September 2009, Representative Paul's bill had 290 co-sponsors-more than enough to secure a vote before the full 435-member House of Representatives.
In addition, the legislation is largely bi-partisan--over 100 of the co-sponsors of Republican Paul's bill are Democrats.162 Senator Sanders' bill has likewise generated bi-partisan support, with 27 sponsors as of September 2009. 163 If Congress were to pass these bills, the GAO could engage in a complete and independent audit of the Fed's activities, both generally and specifically related to its current, unprecedented programs. The audit would include a comprehensive review of the details related to the Fed's illegal equity purchases in the transactions involving Bear Steams and AIG.1 64 The usefulness of such a review was succinctly explained by one commentator: The "particular confluence of the ugly and the unknown [the Maiden Lane LLCs], is exactly why we need an outside, independent audit of the Federal Reserve."' ' 65 Protests by the Fed and its supporters that such authority would infringe upon the Fed's independence are unfounded, as the audits could be structured to narrowly review whether the Fed's activities fall within the scope of its statutory authority.' 66 There is simply no reasonable basis to argue that an investigation into the legality of specific Fed programs would compromise the central bank's independence. Rather than serve as a threat, an audit would force the Fed to more stridently act to conform to the law-appropriate behavior for an entity created by Congress with the ability to bind the federal government and United States citizens to a wide array of near unlimited financial obligations.
A concern by the Fed that a review of the details of this now-hidden activity would result in political gamesmanship, if proven valid, could be accommodated by limiting the disclosure of this information, as is done for disclosures of national security information to Congress for its oversight of military and intelligence agencies. 167 At the very least, elected members of Congress should be afforded the power to see the full details of the Fed's transactions.
Ultimately, the Fed's illegal purchases of private assets from private companies provide the most striking rationale to date for Congress to authorize a comprehensive and independent audit into the central bank's lending and purchasing activities.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established a central banking system that was part private and part public. Unfortunately, the Fed has used its partially private nature to circumvent the scope of its statutory authority under the 1913 Act. The lack of transparency in the Fed's behavior has enabled the Fed to engage in purchases of private assets that are impermissible under the law. As a result, Congress should authorize a comprehensive and independent audit of the Fed's purchasing and lending activities. Only through exposure can the negative effects of the Fed's opaque actions be resolved and the current financial crisis addressed in a productive way.
